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I. INTRODUCTION 
Let me begin by following up on some of the comments re-
garding the antibribery provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act (FCP A). 1 However, let me first point out that, as to the 
record-keeping provisions2 of the Act, the Justice Department has 
pretty much deferred to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) because the SEC has the accountants on its staff. Enforce-
ment of the record-keeping provisions3 has been pretty much the 
burden of the SEC, and the Justice Department has focused its at-
tention and efforts on the antibribery provisions4 which, in some 
ways, we are in a better position to deal with, particularly if one 
looks at it as a straight corruption statute. The SEC and the 
Justice Department are staffed quite differently, the latter being 
better staffed to enforce an anticorruption statute. 
On the antibribery provisions, I think it might be useful for 
me to point out that when you look at sections 103 and 104,5 the 
two antibribery provisions, it is clear that the gravamen of the of-
fense is the corrupt use of an interstate facility for all of the pro-
hibited purposes which would include, with some modifications 
and some limitations, those prohibited purposes which are tradi-
tionally associated with bribery. Now, what does that mean? The 
legislative history makes it clear that you do not have to have a 
completed offense in order to violate the antibribery provisions of 
the Act.6 What that means, as a practical matter, is that when the 
chairman of the board of a major Los Angeles multinational cor-
* Chief, Multinational Fraud Branch, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice 
at the time of this lecture. Presently in private practice, Washington, D.C. 
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 102-104, 91 Stat. 
1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. V 1981)), reprinted in Ap-
pendix I, infra [hereinafter referred to as "the Act" or the "FCPA"]. 
2. Id., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2. 
5. Codified at id. 
6. See H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. 
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poration, sitting in his office in Los Angeles, picks up the 
telephone and calls the prime minister of an Asian country on the 
phone and says to him, "You're about to decide whether your 
country is going to buy 200 of my flying widgets; if you make sure 
that your government purchases our widgets we'll deposit two 
million dollars into your Swiss bank account;" at that point, there 
has been a completed violation of the antibribery provisions of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. All of the elements of the offense 
could be established if the government were able to prove the fact 
of that conversation. That is true even if the Asian prime minister 
said, "That's an outrageous suggestion, and I reject your offer; if 
you come to my country, I'm going to have you arrested for at-
tempted bribery." There would still have been a completed of-
fense with the making of that single phone call. 
That is not terribly different from federal domestic bribery 
law. If that same chairman of the board walked into the office of 
an elected federal official, a federal legislator for example, made 
that same offer, and got that same response from that official, he 
would have violated federal bribery law.7 He made an offer, a cor-
rupt offer, as the term "corrupt" is used in federal bribery law. Of 
course, the thing that is a significant departure in the Act is the 
nature of the offense: there must be some use of an interstate 
facility, such as the telephone or a flight on a commercial airline, 
internationally or within the United States. For example, in one of 
our prosecutions, an airport facility in Florida, from which a 
private airplane took off en route to Qatar, was the basis for the 
charge; the airport itself was considered an interstate facility. 8 
Let me make some additional observations about a few of the 
Act's provisions which are of particular interest. 
II. FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES 
First, let me discuss foreign subsidiaries in connection with 
the Act. Initially, the term "domestic concern" was defined, in the 
House of Representatives version of the bill, to include foreign 
subsidiaries. In the Conference Committee, foreign subsidiaries 
were excluded from the definition of domestic concern. As a conse-
quence, the term "domestic concern," and therefore the coverage 
of section 104 of the Act,9 is limited to corporations, business 
7. 18 u.s.c. § 201 (1980). 
8. United States v. Carver, Civ. No. 79-1768 (S.D. Fla., filed April 9, 1979). 
9. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(B) (Supp. V 1981). 
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trusts, and any other kinds of business entities which are organized 
under the laws of a State, and to foreign corporations which have 
their principal place of business in the United States. 
In addition, "domestic concern" is also defined to include all 
United States citizens.10 Now the significance of that inclusion in 
the Act, in terms of its relationship to foreign subsidiaries, is that, 
although a foreign subsidiary cannot be charged as a principal vio-
lator of the Act, an American citizen who is an employee of that 
foreign subsidiary can be charged as a principal violator, i.e., a 
"domestic concern." An example of the use of that theory occurred 
in the civil injunctive action which was brought in the Carver 
case.11 Carver and his partner had set up a Cayman Islands corpora-
tion. We reached that conduct by charging Carver and his partner, 
because they were United States citizens, as domestic concerns 
under the statute, even though they were theoretically operating 
through a foreign corporation, i.e., their Cayman Islands corpora-
tion. 
I should also add that a foreign subsidiary, or a foreign corpo-
ration, whether it's a subsidiary or not, could also be charged 
under this Act, as in any other criminal statute in the federal 
criminal code, if that foreign corporation is an aider or abettor to a 
principal violator of the statute.12 Such a foreign corporation could 
also be charged as a co-conspirator under 18 U .S.C. § 371. 
III. THE "CORRUPTLY" ST AND ARD 
Now, on the issue of "corruptly," there is a great deal of con-
cern about the meaning of that term. Let me supplement some of 
the things that Frederick Wade said about the word "corruptly" 
by indicating to you the best guide as to the meaning of that term. 
I am focusing on the language in the legislative history which re-
fers to "evil motive or purpose." That language is similar to what 
is contained in the Devitt and Blackmar standard federal jury in-
struction on the meaning of the word corruptly. 13 I am not sure 
10. Id. at § 78dd-2(d)(A). 
11. See supra, note 8. 
12. Title 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1980) provides: 
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, 
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. 
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him 
or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a prin-
cipal. 
13. DEVITT & BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 34.08 (3d ed. 
1977) contains the following language: 
3
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that that language, although it is the way juries are instructed in 
federal criminal trials, is terribly enlightening in terms of the 
meaning of "corruptly." The most significant part of the legis-
lative history, as to the meaning of the word "corruptly," appears 
in the House Report. 14 Let me just read a sentence or two. In the 
House Report, it says, in part, 
The word "corruptly" connotes an evil motive or purpose such as 
that required under 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), which prohibits domestic 
bribery. As in 18 U .S.C. § 201(b), the word "corruptly" indicates 
an intent or desire wrongfully to influence the recipient. It does 
not require the act to be fully consummated, or succeed in pro-
ducing the desired outcome.15 
The significance of that legislative history is that one can 
then argue that the meaning of the word "corruptly" in the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act can be divined from looking at the 
cases that construe the term "corruptly" in 18 U .S.C. § 201. I would 
suggest to you that a good starting place in that journey would be 
United States v. Brewster. 16 Without getting into the details of 
the Brewster case, Brewster had been charged with a violation of 
both the bribery subsection and the gratuities subsection of the 
statute. A bribe is covered by 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) and is a fifteen-
year felony. An illegal gratuity is covered by 18 U.S.C. § 201(g) 
and is a lesser felony. Brewster was acquitted of the major 
bribery charge, but convicted of taking an illegal gratuity. The 
issue in the Brewster case for the Court of Appeals was to define 
the difference between an illegal gratuity and a bribe under 18 
U.S.C. § 201. I will read to you what you might consider to be one 
of the more significant parts of the Brewster case, in terms of pro-
viding guidance as to the meaning of "corruptly." The Court said: 
An act is "corruptly" done, if done voluntarily and intentionally, and with the 
bad purpose of accomplishing either an unlawful end or result, or a lawful end or 
result by some unlawful method or means. 
So, a person acts "corruptly" whenever he makes a willful attempt to per-
suade or influence the official action of a public official, by an offer of money or 
anything of value. 
The motive to act "corruptly" is ordinarily a hope or expectation of either 
financial gain or other benefit to one's self, or some aid or profit or benefit to 
another. 
14. H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977). 
15. Id. at 8. 
16. 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
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The bribery section [that is, 201(c)] makes necessary an explicit 
quid pro quo, which need not exist if only an illegal gratuity is in-
volved. The bribe is the mover or producer of the official act, but 
the official act for which the gratuity is given might have been 
done without the gratuity, although the gratuity was produced 
because of the official act. 11 
287 
I would suggest that one can construe the term "corrupt" in 
the FCP A, consistent with the Brewster decision, to mean, as a 
kind of rule of thumb, that there must be a quid pro quo: "I'll pay 
you in return for your doing this official act to benefit me." 
A. Extortion 
The issue of the meaning of "corrupt" raises a series of other 
related issues under the Act which have been of significant con-
cern to people. First, what about the issue of extortion? What 
about the situation where a company operating in a foreign coun-
try is told, "You must pay me this or you will not get the 
contract." Or a foreign official says, "You must pay me this or we 
will expropriate your business." Or, "You must pay me this or we 
will," (to use the language from the legislative history) "dynamite 
your oil rig." 
Now that raises a whole series of interesting and sometimes 
difficult questions as to the extent to which extortion is a defense 
under the Act. I would suggest to you that, here again, the mean-
ing of the term corrupt as used in 18 U.S.C. § 201 is helpful. On the 
issue of extortion, the legislative history 18 reads as follows: "Sec-
tion 103 and 104 cover payments and gifts intended to influence 
the recipient regardless of who first suggested the payment or 
gift." 19 
Let me pause here to interject that that sentence is designed 
to make clear that the common law distinction between extortion 
and bribery is eliminated under this Act. As some of you may 
know, at common law, the distinction between extortion and 
bribery turned on who first proposed the payment. If the govern-
ment official first proposed the payment, then it was extortion. If 
the citizen first proposed the payment, it was bribery. Well, of 
17. Id. at 82 (bracket added). 
18. S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 
4098. 
19. Id. at 10. 
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course that resulted in some difficult choices for the government, 
depending on what the proof was. If you charged extortion and the 
proof showed bribery, or charged bribery and the defense can 
establish extortion in that the foreign official first broached the of-
fer, then the defendant is acquitted. What is clear from this 
legislative history is that the common law distinction is 
eliminated. It is irrelevant who first proposed the payment. 
Going back to the legislative history, it states: "The defense 
that the payment was demanded on the part of the government of-
ficial as a price for gaining entry into a market or to obtain a con-
tract would not suffice since at some point the U.S. company 
would make a conscious decision whether or not to pay a bribe." 20 
Let me interject here that that legislative history means that 
if the payment is to obtain business, that is, to get into the market 
in the first place, such a payment is corrupt and therefore illegal, 
and not a lawful payment made in response to an extortion de-
mand by the foreign official. The reason being that the company 
has the choice of not going into the market at all. Its will is not be-
ing overborne. The company has freedom of choice. The legislative 
history goes on to say: 
That the payment may have been at first proposed by the reci-
pient rather than the U.S. Company does not alter the corrupt 
purpose on the part of the person paying the bribe. On the other 
hand, true extortion situations would not be covered by this pro-
vision since a payment to an official to keep an oil rig from being 
dynamited should not be held to be made with the requisite cor-
rupt purpose.21 
I would suggest to you that this language from the legislative 
history is consistent with the definition of the term "corruptly" as 
it is used in federal domestic bribery law. Extortion in federal 
domestic bribery law, it is clear, is not a complete defense to a 
charge of bribery. Evidence of extortion is, however, admissible at 
the trial in that it is relevant to the issue of whether or not the 
defendant had a corrupt intent at the time he made the payment. 
U.S. v. Barash 22 deals with the relationship between extortion and 
the issue of corrupt intent. Basically, the courts have found that 
such evidence is admissible and is to be considered by the jury in 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 10-11. 
22. 365 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1966). 
6
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1982], Art. 6
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol9/iss2/6
1982] Enforcement 289 
making its finding of fact as to whether there was a corrupt intent. 
United States v. Kahn 23 deals with this same issue. Let me 
quote an interpretation of Barash from the Kahn case. 
Finally, as a policy matter, we think that the Barash rule is the 
preferable one. Almost every bribery case involves at least some 
coercion by the public official. The instances of honest men being 
corrupted by "dirty money," if not non-existent, are at least ex-
ceedingly rare. The proper response to coercion by corrupt 
public officials should be to go to the authorities, not to make the 
payoff. Thus, unless the extortion is so overpowering as to 
negate criminal intent or willfulness we would be loath to allow 
those who give in to illegal coercion to claim it as a total defense 
to bribery charges.24 
I would suggest that it would be very difficult to establish that 
one did not have a corrupt intent on the basis that the payment 
was extorted. The evidence of extortion must be strong enough, 
as the Kahn court indicated, to negate criminal intent. 
Evidence of economic extortion, as contrasted to threats of 
violence to persons or to property which is referred to in the 
legislative history, is also admissible on the issue of corrupt in-
tent. This notion is supported by the federal domestic bribery 
cases. 
IV. ENFORCEMENT POLICIES OF THE 
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
Let me move on to discuss some of the enforcement policies 
the Department of Justice has adopted relating to the Act. These 
policies apply both to criminal enforcement actions and civil en-
forcement actions, since Justice has civil injunctive authority for 
domestic concerns. 
You might be interested to know that, because of the obvious 
sensitivity both from a national security point of view and a 
foreign policy point of view, the Department has administered the 
enforcement of this statute quite differently than the enforcement 
of most of the provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code. Ad-
ministration of the enforcement effort has been highly centralized. 
Generally, FCPA cases, by the terms of the United States At-
torney's Manual, are not investigated and prosecuted by the 
23. 472 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1973). 
24. Id. at 278. 
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ninety-four United States Attorney's Offices around the country. 
They are primarily investigated and prosecuted by the Multina-
tional Fraud Branch in the Criminal Division at the Justice De-
partment. Among other reasons, that is being done to make sure 
that there is a nationally uniform enforcement policy. Moreover, 
virtually any step that is taken in the investigative process, even 
more than in the post-indictment process, has potentially signifi-
cant foreign policy and national security implications. 
At the current time we have about sixty cases under investi-
gation. Thus far, we have closed without prosecution perhaps 
another thirty cases. Justice has had only two cases in which 
public charges have been brought under the antibribery provi-
sions of the FCP A: one was a civil injunctive action, United States 
v. Carver25 filed in the Southern District of Florida; and the other, 
United States v. Kenny International Corp. 26 filed in the District 
of Columbia. 
One of the reasons for the limited number of prosecutions 
under the Act is that much of our time, until quite recently, has 
been spent in the investigation and prosecution of what has been 
commonly referred to as the pre-Act or pre-Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act overseas payment cases. There were a long series of pros-
ecutions of companies in connection with those overseas payment 
cases in which the conduct pre-dated the existence of the FCP A.27 
25. Supra note 8. 
26. Crim. No. 79-372 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 2, 1979) and United States v. Kenny Interna-
tional Corp., Civ. No. 79-2038 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 2, 1979). 
Since this lecture was given, the Justice Department has initiated some additional 
FCPA prosecutions: United States v. C.E. Miller Corporation, Crim. No. 82-788 (C.D. Cal., 
filed Sept. 17, 1982); United States v. Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc., Crim. No. H-82-207 (S.D. 
Tex., filed Sept. 22, 1982); United States v. Crawford Enterprises, Inc., Crim. No. H-82-224 
(S.D. Tex., filed Oct. 22, 1982); United States v. International Harvester Co., Crim. No. 
H-82-244 (S.D. Tex., filed Nov. 18, 1982); United States v. Applied Process Products 
Overseas, Inc., Crim. No. 83-004 (D.D.C., filed Jan. 5, 1983); United States v. Gary D. 
Bateman, Civ. No. 83-014 (D.D.C., filed Jan. 5, 1983); and a related case, United States v. 
Gary D. Bateman, Crim. No. 83-005 (D.D.C., filed Jan. 5, 1983). 
27. See United States v. The Williams Companies, Crim. No. 78-144 (D.D.C., filed 
March 24, 1978); United States v. Control Data Corp., Crim. No. 78-210 (D.D.C., filed April 
26, 1978); United States v. United Brands Co., Crim. No. 78-538 (S.D.N.Y., filed July 19, 
1978); United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Crim. No. 78-566 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 20, 
1978); United States v. Gulfstream American Corp., Crim. No. 79-7 (D.D.C., filed Jan. 3, 
1979); United States v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Crim. No. 79-270 (D.D.C., filed June 1, 
1979); United States v. Page Airways, Inc., Crim. No. 79-273 (D.D.C., filed June 4, 1979); 
United States v. Textron, Inc., Crim. No. 79-330 (D.D.C., filed July 10, 1979); United States 
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., Crim. No. 79-516 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 9, 1979); United States v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., Crim. No. 80-431 (S.D.N.Y., filed July 24, 1980); United States v. The 
Boeing Co., Crim. No. 82-199 (D.D.C., filed July 30, 1982). 
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A variety of criminal statutes were utilized, including the Currency 
and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act,28 the false statements 
statutes29 and, to a lesser extent, the mail and wire fraud 
statutes.30 Much of the Department's time until now has been de-
voted to finishing those cases, many of which were enormously 
complex. The Department is now completing the final phases of 
that pre-Act enforcement effort and has begun to focus more at-
tention on post-FCP A investigations and prosecutions. 
V. INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES 
At this point I would like to discuss some of the unique inves-
tigative approaches which are being utilized by the Justice De-
partment because of the unique nature of the Act, particularly in 
terms of its foreign policy implications. Initially, as a general rule, 
what we try to do in these cases is to focus our investigative effort 
in the United States, without informing the foreign government in 
question of the fact that we are investigating. But I should add 
that there are obviously some exceptions to that general rule. The 
primary reason we generally do not notify the foreign government 
at the beginning of an investigation is that, as you can well im-
agine, it is relatively easy for confidence men, whether they be 
company employees or independent agents, to claim that they 
need an extra million dollars added to the commission fee because 
they must pass the extra money to the prime minister of the country 
involved in order to obtain the contract. In fact, these employees or 
agents never talked to the prime minister and have no intention of 
bribing him. It is merely a fraud or a device to increase their own 
fee. They deposit the extra million dollars into their own or a con-
federate's Swiss bank account. 
When an informant or an insider tells us that there is a bribe 
in process or that a bribe of a foreign government official has 
already occurred, we do not immediately notify the foreign 
government. As you can well imagine, if we started to com-
municate to a foreign government every unsupported and uncor-
roborated allegation of bribery of its officials, there would be 
worldwide foreign relations turmoil, given the ease with which 
such allegations can be made by persons with ulterior motives. 
This point is best evidenced by the fact that we have closed a 
significant number of cases without any prosecution. 
28. 31 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. 
29. 18 u.s.c. § 1001. 
30. Id. at §§ 1341, 1343. 
9
Shine: Enforcement
Published by SURFACE, 1982
292 Syr. J. Int'I L. & Com. [Vol. 9:283 
We have avoided this problem by focusing our investigation 
within the United States and closely controlling dissemination of 
the allegation and any information developed. We have sought 
evidence initially from witnesses in the United States, corporate 
records maintained within the United States, and bank records 
and whatever other sources we might have available in the United 
States. Only after we have concluded, as a result of our initial in-
vestigation, that indeed there is significant reason to believe a 
bribe was paid or offered to a foreign government official, do we 
notify the foreign government. 
A. Notification of foreign governments and disclosure of the 
identity of foreign officials in indictments and complaints 
In order to deal with the problems of international investiga-
tion and with the foreign policy consequences of much of what we 
do, we have established an informal procedure with our colleagues 
at the State Department. The procedure is two-fold. First, we do 
not tell our colleagues at the State Department anything at all 
about our investigations as they are proceeding. We do not pass 
information to the State Department about the substance of what 
we are investigating or what we are developing. Consequently, 
the State Department can not pass along information on the in-
vestigation to the United States Ambassador in the country in 
question. That is a long-standing policy, agreed upon by us and our 
colleagues at State. It is designed primarily to avoid politicization 
of these investigations in a way that could prove embarrassing to 
the United States. 
Many ambassadors are not happy with this policy, as you can 
well imagine. However, if for example, the United States Am-
bassador were told that the Justice Department had received 
allegations that a bribe had been paid to Minister X, and Minister 
X, having learned of the investigation, questions the Ambassador 
about the investigation at a cocktail party, the Ambassador is then 
in a rather untenable position. Either he discloses to Minister X 
what he knows about the investigation or he dissembles. Even if 
he dissembles, the Ambassador may inadvertently and unknow-
ingly disclose something to Minister X that would compromise the 
investigation. Therefore, both State and Justice have agreed that 
both agencies are better off if the Ambassador does not know 
about Department of Justice investigations. This is particularly 
true since, as I have already indicated, many of these investiga-
10
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tions are closed without prosecutions. It would cause unnecessary 
complications to American foreign relations if the State Depart-
ment were to know ahout every allegation and the details of our 
investigations. 
However, the second part of this procedure is an arrange-
ment for notification of the State Department when we reasonably 
anticipate something happening in the investigation which will 
make public the fact of the investigation or the allegation. If we 
are about to file a criminal charge or a civil complaint which names 
the foreign official or foreign country, we will first notify the State 
Department so that it can notify the United States Embassy, 
which will pass the appropriate diplomatic note to the foreign 
government. Therefore, the foreign government will first learn 
about the investigation through formal diplomatic channels and 
not through the newspaper. Then the foreign government is not 
caught by surprise, which is of crucial importance in maintaining 
stable diplomatic relations. Moreover, if for example, and this has 
already happened in some instances, during a grand jury in-
vestigation a witness refuses to answer questions, we may have to 
ask the court to hold the witness in civil contempt. If we ask the 
court to incarcerate the witness until the witness answers the 
questions, that will be part of a public proceeding in which some of 
the allegations may be disclosed. When we anticipate that might 
happen, we also notify the State Department so that it can formal-
ly notify the foreign government. 
In regard to notification of the foreign government, let me 
mention something of interest to the many private practitioners 
around the country who may become involved in our cases. In our 
public pleadings, whether we are bringing an indictment or filing 
a civil complaint, generally we will not agree to withhold the iden-
tity of the foreign country or of the foreign official. Our current 
policy evolved out of our experience in the Westinghouse 31 pre-Act 
prosecution. Let me first indicate what happened in that case. 
Then I will explain our current policy. 
In the Westinghouse case, which involved bribes to an in-
dividual who was, at the time of the prosecution, the Deputy 
Prime Minister of Egypt, we initially agreed with the company to 
with old the identity of the foreign official and the country. We 
reached this agreement because, at the time of the plea, the late 
31. See supra note 27. 
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President Sadat was in the United States negotiating a peace set-
tlement in the Middle East. For a variety of reasons, the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the plea 
bargain. The Court objected, among other things, to the fact that, 
by the terms of the plea agreement, the name of the country and 
of the foreign official would not be disclosed in public. The day 
after the plea agreement was rejected, sources outside the Justice 
Department leaked to the press the identity of the country and of 
the official. Therefore, when we went back into court everything 
was disclosed in the pleadings. To our great relief, the disclosure 
had .no impact whatsoever on our foreign relations with any na-
tion, including Egypt. Moreover, the Egyptian government strip-
ped the Deputy Prime Minister of his parliamentary immunity and 
prosecuted him in Egypt for bribery. Indeed, the Egyptian 
government, as have the governments of a number of other coun-
tries in which there have been allegations of widespread corrup-
tion, has now launched a major anticorruption campaign. 
As a result of our experience in the Westinghouse case, we 
adopted a more refined policy dealing with the disclosure vel non 
of the identity of the country or of the foreign official as part of 
plea agreements in FCP A cases. This policy applies only in the 
plea bargain situation since, obviously, if an indictment is to be 
litigated we have to allege all of the details of the transaction 
which we would have to prove at trial. In the plea bargain situa-
tion, we will agree not to disclose the identity of the country or of 
the foreign official only if there is a satisfactory law enforcement 
or foreign policy basis to do so. The law enforcement basis is 
limited to those situations where there would be significant risk of 
death or great bodily injury to persons if the identity of the coun-
try or of the official is disclosed. In that regard, our general posi-
tion is that the presence of company employees in the foreign 
country is not a sufficient basis for nondisclosure. We can control 
the timing of any public disclosures. The company can avoid 
danger to its employees by simply removing them from the coun-
try in advance of the public plea, particularly if the employees are 
United States citizens. However, if we believe that there is an 
unavoidable risk of death or great bodily injury to persons if full 
disclosure is made, we will agree to withhold the identity of the 
country or of the official. I should add, however, that such a situa-
tion has yet to arise. 
The only other basis upon which we will agree to non-
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disclosure is that of' foreign policy. However, the foreign policy 
reasons for nondisclosure must be communicated to the Justice 
Department in writing by the State Department. If we receive 
such a communication, then we would certainly consider it in mak-
ing the decision on whether to insist on full disclosure. I might add 
that thus far we have never received such a written communica-
tion, although a number of people have asked the State Depart-
ment to send us that kind of written request. The State Depart-
ment has yet to find that any of our cases are of such a nature that 
full disclosure would significantly damage United States foreign 
policy interests. 
B. Notification of foreign governments and investigative 
cooperation through the use of' executive 
agreements on mutual assistance 
There is one other major circumstance in which we will go to 
the foreign government for reasons other than anticipated public 
disclosures in the United States. When our investigation has ad-
vanced to the point where we are convinced that there was indeed 
criminal activity, not only in the United States under the FCP A, 
but criminal activity in the foreign country under its own domestic 
bribery laws, and we have reason to believe that we may receive 
investigative assistance from the foreign government because 
that government is interested in enforcing its own domestic brib-
ery laws, we may then make disclosures to the foreign govern-
ment. 
But we proceed in some very special ways. First, we will go to 
the foreign government only on a prosecutor-to-prosecutor basis. 
We never do any of these investigations through the use of Inter-
pol, which in ordinary criminal cases conducts many transnational 
criminal investigations. In the ordinary case, Interpol people in 
the United States ask the local police in the foreign country to do 
the investigation for them. Because of the nature of the allegations 
we are investigating, using Interpol would be similar to asking the 
local police in the United States to investigate an allegation that 
the President took a bribe. It would be explosive in the foreign 
country. It would be far beyond what one would reasonably expect 
local law enforcement in that country to handle. As a consequence 
we have never used Interpol to assist us in these investigations. 
Secondly, when we have reached the conclusion that we may 
be able to get assistance from the foreign government, we first 
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seek an executive agreement on mutual assistance. The executive 
agreement is an agreement between our Department of Justice 
and the Ministry of Justice of the foreign government. They are 
not government-to-government agreements. They are also limited 
by their terms to particular investigations. We currently have in 
force executive agreements on mutual assistance with the 
ministries of justice of twenty-six foreign governments. 
As background information, these agreements represent a 
policy begun in 1976 by the Justice Department, with the concur-
rence of the SEC and the State Department. At that time the 
overseas bribery scandals became public in the United States, the 
first major one that resulted in an agreement being the scandal in-
volving Lockheed. In 1976, after the public disclosures in the 
United States involving Lockheed's activities in the Netherlands, 
Japan and Italy, those governments, of course, asked us to dis-
close our evidence to them. At that time the Justice Department 
adopted a policy which is still in effect today. We will not pass any 
information to a foreign government relating to illicit payments in 
that country unless that government first enters into an executive 
agreement on mutual assistance with us. Such agreements were 
entered into with Italy,32 Japan,33 and the Netherlands34 in 
mid-1976 in connection with the Lockheed matter. Since that time 
we have negotiated agreements with the ministries of justice of an 
additional twenty-three countries. A number of those agreements 
have since been amended to include additional investigations. 
Basically, the agreements do two things. First, each Depart-
ment obligates itself to keep confidential and in law enforcement 
channels any evidence or information received pursuant to the 
agreement. Such information may be made public only in connec-
tion with administrative, civil or criminal judicial proceedings. 
The agreements are designed to prevent the minister of justice 
from receiving information from us and then releasing it at a press 
32. Procedures for Mutual Assistance in the Administration of Justice in Connection 
with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter, March 29, 1976, United States-Italy, 27 
U.S.T. 3437, T.I.A.S. No. 8374. 
33. Procedures for Mutual Assistance in the Administration of Justice in Connection 
with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter, March 23, 1976, United States-Japan, 27 
U.S.T. 946, T.I.A.S. No. 8233. 
34. Procedures for Mutual Assistance in the Administration of Justice in Connection 
with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter, March 29, 1976, United States-Netherlands, 
27 U.S.T. 1064, T.I.A.S. 8245. 
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conference the next day. The information may only be used for 
legitimate law enforcement purposes. This prevents, as would 
otherwise happen in Japan for example, the disclosure of the infor-
mation given to the foreign government to investigative commit-
tees of the legislature. The second significant purpose of the 
agreements is that they obligate the ministries in both countries 
to use their best efforts, within the confines of their domestic law, 
to assist each other in the investigation, and any prosecutions 
which may result from the investigations. 
It should be noted that the agreements are limited to illicit 
payment cases. Moreover, they are limited by their terms to par-
ticular investigations. Most of the agreements came into being 
because, with all due respect to my colleagues from the SEC, the 
SEC had a number of cases in which they filed civil injunctive ac-
tions naming countries and officials. That, of course, always caused 
those countries to ask the Justice Department for information. In 
response, the Justice Department said, with the concurrence of 
the SEC, that unless there was an executive agreement, we would 
not give the information to the foreign government. The bulk of 
the agreements, therefore, were initially negotiated as a result of 
prior public disclosures in the United States by the SEC. 
We have now started, in the last year or so, to use the 
agreements in a more aggressive way. Until that time the fact of 
the investigation and the identity of the company was already a 
matter of public record. Therefore, the agreement itself would 
disclose the fact that it covered the investigation of the Boeing 
Company or the McDonnell-Douglas Corporation. Lately, when we 
are conducting a non-public investigation and we reach a point 
where we feel it is appropriate to go to the foreign government, 
we contact that government through diplomatic channels and seek 
an amendment to the agreement. Rather than publicly identify in 
the agreement the company which is under the investigation, 
which for obvious reasons we do not want to do, we have started 
to identify the investigations by means of Justice Department 
numbers. In more recent agreements, therefore, instead of a com-
pany name you will find a Justice Department investigation 
number such as MA101. The significant thing is that in some in-
stances we are notifying the foreign government in advance, ob-
taining its commitment to help us, and assisting that government 
to enforce its own bribery laws simultaneously with the enforce-
ment of the FCP A. 
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C. Bilateral Mutual Assistance Treaties 
Permit me to draw a distinction between these executive 
agreements on mutual assistance which thus far, as I said, have 
been limited to illicit payment cases, and another federal initiative 
in the field of bilateral mutual assistance treaties. Since 1979 when 
the Office of International Affairs (OIA) in the Criminal Division 
was created, there has been a continuous effort to negotiate 
bilateral mutual assistance treaties. The first and earliest such 
treaty was negotiated with the Swiss in 1977 before OIA was 
created. The Swiss Treaty35 is limited to providing assistance in 
criminal matters. 
These are broad-based treaties in that they apply to all 
criminal matters, not just illicit payment cases. The Swiss treaty 
is a fairly long, complex document. Some have suggested that it is 
too long and too complex. In any case, the treaties are primarily 
designed to make more efficient the international evidence gather-
ing process by eliminating the need for letters rogatory. The tradi· 
tional means of obtaining evidence has been through letters 
rogatory. The letters are issued by a court in the United States, 
and are addressed to a court in the foreign jurisdiction seeking 
that court's assistance. The letters are sent to the State Depart-
ment, which sends them through diplomatic channels to the 
United States Embassy in the foreign country. The Embassy then 
transmits the documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of that 
country, which transmits them to the foreign Attorney General or 
to the foreign court directly. It is an extraordinarily inefficient 
process sometimes ta~ing eight months or a year. 
In lieu of the letters rogatory process, the Mutual Assistance 
Treaties provide for a "Competent Authority" to be appointed in 
each country, usually the Ministry of Justice in each country. The 
two competent authorities then make direct prosecutor-to-
prosecutor requests of each other, avoiding the diplomatic chan-
nel. These written requests do not involve the courts, which must 
sign letters rogatory requests. These treaties, depending upon the 
country involved, can by their terms modify domestic law. In the 
United States, since treaty law is supreme, the treaties do modify 
our domestic law. 
35. Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, January 23, 1977, United States-Switzer-
land, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302. 
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As a result of, for example, the 1977 Swiss treaty, we may 
now obtain Swiss bank records for use in criminal prosecutions, 
notwithstanding prior provisions to the contrary in Swiss bank 
secrecy laws. Since the OJA was created, there has been a con-
certed effort to negotiate similar treaties with other countries. 
There has been a similar treaty negotiated with Turkey which has 
been ratified both by the Senate and by the Turkish government 
and is now in effect.36 Treaties have been negotiated with the 
Netherlands and Colombia, which have been ratified by the 
Senate but are still awaiting ratification by the two treaty part-
ners. Treaties now are being negotiated with Germany, Italy, and 
several other countries. 37 
I should add that in all of these negotiations, we initially try 
to have the treaty cover not only criminal matters, but civil and 
administrative matters as well. The Dutch, I believe, have agreed 
to a treaty which covers not only criminal, but civil and ad-
ministrative matters. Of course, the Swiss treaty, even with the 
recent interest of the SEC, is limited to criminal matters. 
VI. FCPA REVIEW PROCEDURE 
In conclusion, I would be remiss if I did not briefly describe 
the procedure the Justice Department has established to provide 
guidance to the business community on the FCP A. In 1980 we 
established the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review 
Procedure.38 Basically the Procedure is modelled after the An-
titrust Division's Business Review Procedure. It permits a com-
pany to submit to us a Review Request, in writing, describing a 
proposed transaction. We will then indicate whether or not we will 
take an enforcement action, if the transaction proceeds. Thus far, 
there have been ten Review Releases under the Review Pro-
cedure. 
In establishing the Procedure, we have maximized the protec-
tion from public disclosure that we provide to confidential 
business information. The first four releases, issued in 1980, dealt 
with a variety of issues, some of which are addressed in S.708, a 
36. Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Jan. l, 1981, 
United States-Turkey,_ U.S.T. _, T.I.A.S. No. 9891. 
37. In November 1982 the United States signed a Mutual Assistance Treaty with Italy 
which, like the Treaties with the Netherlands and Colombia, is now pending final ratifica-
tion before it goes into effect. 
38. 28 C.F.R. § 50.18. 
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bill to amend the FCPA.39 Release Number 80-4, involving 
Lockheed and Sulyman Olayan in Saudi Arabia, is of particular in-
terest.40 It sets out a fact pattern outlining a situation where, 
under certain very limited circumstances, a company may enter 
into a business relationship with someone who is also a foreign 
government official. The Release does not, by any means, support 
the notion that a company can hire as an agent a full-time official 
of a foreign government, particularly when that official is going to 
decide whether or not the company will get a contract. It is a much 
more narrow Release in that Olayan was, if you will, similar to a 
very part-time, outside director in his capacity as a government of-
ficial. 
We issued, in 1981, two more Releases. The one which may be 
of particular interest involves Bechtel. The issue of "reason to 
know" under the FCP A and the precautionary steps that were 
taken by Bechtel to avoid a "reason to know" problem were dealt 
with the Release Number 81-2. Under the circumstances, we indi-
cated we would not take an enforcement action. 
Finally, there have been four Releases issued in 1982. Release 
Number 82-1 deals with another important current issue under the 
Act. It involves the payment of a finder's fee to an agent which is 
not necessarily related to services performed by the agent. Release 
Number 82-2 involves a Request by the State of Missouri relating to 
promotional expenses. The State, in combination with some private 
business interests, wanted to bring to Missouri foreign government 
officials in connection with promotional activities. The State 
wanted to pay for the travel and entertainment expenses of the 
officials. Such promotional expenses are also addressed in S.708. 
The Releases all indicate that our decision is not binding on 
anyone other than the parties submitting the Review Request. 
However, the Releases are issued to provide some guidance to the 
private practitioner and to the business community. The most 
significant thing, from the corporation's point of view, about the 
availability of the Review Procedure is that, even in situations 
where they may be a "technical violation" of the FCP A, the com-
pany can obtain from us in advance a binding exercise of pro-
secutorial discretion. 
39. S. 708 was passed by the Senate on November 23, 1981 during the ninety-seventh 
Congress. S. 708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 13,983-85 (1981). No action was taken 
by the House on S. 708 during that Congress. 
40. The Review Releases have not been published but are available upon request from 
the Department's Public Information Office. 
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